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Doctor_Impossible_ t1_je46b50 wrote

>Can anybody explain what it is about monarchies that the Iranian regime is so opposed to?

Perhaps if the monarchy hadn't been, or hadn't been seen as, the puppet of foreign interests, Iranians wouldn't have had such a dislike for it. I'm not sure that the type of government Iran had mattered so much as how it operated. An autocratic government is one thing, but subjecting people to that, political/religious repression, inflation, corruption, and violence made revolution inevitable. If the government had ostensibly been a democracy, the result would have been the same, and the succeeding rulers would have denounced democracy in a similar fashion.

>I find this confusing because it seems to me that the present-day Iranian theocracy is very similar to a monarchy itself.

Superficially, yes, and you can argue that perhaps the theocracy is merely a means to an end for some who seek power, but I don't think it's possible to claim that the systems are the same because you have observed one similarity. In a monarchy a ruler can, within some unofficial limitations, make whatever decisions they wish and are not accountable to a higher authority, nor do their decisions have to come from, or be in line with, precedent. In a theocracy, religion informs the rule of the state, and there are conventions, lines of reasoning, and established precedent for virtually all decisions that do not equate to "Because I say so." from a supreme ruler. Whether it is done sincerely, or as an excuse, is another matter.

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quantdave t1_jea5hix wrote

>Perhaps if the monarchy hadn't been, or hadn't been seen as, the puppet of foreign interests, Iranians wouldn't have had such a dislike for it.

That was a big trigger in 1979, but over the longer term there had also been an erosion of perceived domestic legitimacy of successive dynasties from the 18th century onward: the last dynasty's origin in a fairly modern-looking military coup (allegedly with British involvement) didn't endear it to legitimist detractors, though as ever the clergy varied in its engagement with the throne.

Religious traditionalists were also alienated by the Pahlavi rulers' sporadic modernisation efforts: it's too readily forgotten that Khomeini's final breach with the throne came not over its pro-western leanings or autocratic rule but over the 1963 land reform which he saw as eroding the proper rural hierarchy. The revolution's mix of popular and traditionalist aspirations underlies much of its subsequent evolution and the idiosyncrasies we may find perplexing.

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