Atilla_The_Honey t1_j99xtdn wrote
Reply to comment by Ytar0 in Compatibilism is supported by deep intuitions about responsibility and control. It can also feel "obviously" wrong and absurd. Slavoj Žižek's commentary can help us navigate the intuitive standoff. by matthewharlow
I’ve seen something like this argument before and I wonder if you can clarify it for me. In the first premise, what does “could have done otherwise” mean? That if they had decided to do otherwise, they could have?
Surely in a deterministic universe this could still be true, because the deciding to do otherwise would be part of the causal chain leading them to act, so changing that part could change the resulting action.
I don’t really understand the second premise either - surely whether the universe is deterministic or not, once an action has been taken it can’t be changed. Can you clarify how someone could do otherwise than they actually do in any kind of universe?
I think I broadly agree that the article above is arguing from a different conception of free will, in a rather sneaky way.
dirtmother t1_j9acftr wrote
Compatibilism often reads to me as, "I will express my moral intuition, and I never could have done otherwise".
Correct me if I'm wrong lol.
Ytar0 t1_j99z04n wrote
Determinism ultimately means that there only is one possible future. And that all actions will inevitably lead to that future. From an outside perspective we are simply following the laws of casualty.
So “deciding to do otherwise” means creating a different future, one where you has done otherwise than what was predetermined. Idk if that makes more sense.
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