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eliyah23rd t1_iwqi07r wrote

Reply to comment by simonperry955 in The structure of moral normativity by simonperry955

I think the best way to describe our difference is that your project is descriptive and mine is prescriptive. You want the to discover the cause and I am looking for solutions.

However, that simplifies our position a little. In order to propose solutions, I look to build the descriptive case correctly. I am very minimalist about descriptive assumptions, but I cannot avoid them all.

You, on the other hand, seem to propose a sort of “Inference to Best Explanation” argument for motivating the genealogy that you propose. This is a classic descriptive project strategy. However, your last comment highlights that there is a prescriptive wish behind your project, an agenda, if you will. While you present your evidence irrespective of moral outcome, you seem to be motivated by a belief that should your view be accepted, the world would be a better place.

One last point, if I may. You use the word “ought” a number of times. On page 20 you even use it with reference to Hume. However, like de Waal, your use of “ought” seems to be the hypothetical (IF you want X you ought to Y) meaning of “ought” and not the categorical (You ought to Y). To me it seems clear that Hume is very clear that he is referring to the categorical “ought”. I’d be interested to know whether you agree that (a) you are using the hypothetical and (b) Hume is using the categorical.

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simonperry955 OP t1_iwqzevl wrote

You're right, I take a descriptive approach. My personal view is that the world would be a better place (all concerned would thrive more) if everyone was prosocial and moral (i.e., enforced norms).

The descriptive case to be made depends on surely what you want to achieve. If it's mutual benefit, then prosociality is the way to go.

My understanding of the is-ought problem has moved on since I wrote the entry in the ebook. I provide a descriptive ought, not an imperative ought. I describe the fact that people feel they ought to X, and give natural reasons why they feel this way. To move to an imperative ought, one possible goal or imperative is the thriving or flourishing of the self and others, optimally. After all, each organism experiences a pressure or imperative to thrive or flourish.

Each entry in this list of features of morality, is a source of moral oughtness, including instrumental oughtness, which provides the original pressure to achieve goals. Moral oughtness is derived from the pressure to achieve goals jointly. So, moral oughtness comes from others towards me (partner control) as well as from me to others (responsibility).

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eliyah23rd t1_ix48b3j wrote

I know that I'm responding to your post from three days ago but I've been thinking a lot about our discussion.

In the light of your response, I think the categorical-hypothetical distinction is not sufficient. The pressure that one person exerts on the other (partner) is to accept a categorical. Since this pressure may be a direct appeal to a non-linguistic "irrational" motivator, it may not be saying explicitly "IF you want to partner THEN you must seek X". For example the parent just encourages "seek X" even though the unwritten motivator is that the child desires to align with the parent.

However, this still leaves the analysis in the realm of the descriptive. The researcher identifies these pressures between partners.

But when I switch out of the role of observer to the rational subjective, I am not considering the observed objects. I ask only whether my partner has any hypothetical suggestions for me given the goals I already have. I reject any attempt to request the categorical (without a justifying hypothetical) as manipulation. As a rational actor I still have no reason I "should" accept a new categorical or modify the goals I already have.

The idea that I should accept any categorical because it has in the past been the cause of the current state of affairs, holds no appeal for me. That is the naturalistic fallacy.

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simonperry955 OP t1_ix9kcxg wrote

I think the categorical / hypothetical imperative distinction is a good one. If I want to thrive and survive, then I need to do it *this* way (which may be instrumental or moral, depending on whether I need to do it with others).

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eliyah23rd t1_ixdgl80 wrote

Oh, I wasn't retracting on the value of the distinction. However, you had made me realize that the descriptive project can record the fact of one partner pressuring the other to accept a categorical and not just a hypothetical value.

I think I need to retreat to a usage that involves logic/reason. My position is that this pressure cannot succeed at a logical argument for accepting a categorical but only a hypothetical. It can try, but it must fail. However, limbic, non-lingustic pressure to accept a categorical is found everywhere.

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simonperry955 OP t1_ixe8xks wrote

That's probably because the limbic system accepts thriving and surviving as an unquestioned goal. Anything that promotes these, to the limbic system, is a categorical imperative.

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