Recent comments in /f/philosophy

cybicle t1_je3rchs wrote

Without knowing what you've been through, I can only speculate that you also have a strong sense of perseverance.

I think perseverance overlaps with hope, with hope focusing on achieving a desired outcome, and perseverance focusing on avoiding an unwanted outcome.

They aren't mutually exclusive, they just allow you to view your challenges from different perspectives.

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cybicle t1_je3qlfj wrote

Either way, blessing and/or curse, hope itself doesn't deliver the victory or the final blow. It only affects us and how we see our plight, the circumstances we face aren't directly modified by our hope.

e.g. The mountain doesn't say to itself "These climbers are genuinely hopeful. I'll hold off on the next storm, so they can summit."

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[deleted] t1_je3gml2 wrote

Yeah, this is what came to my mind, too. "Grace" is a good word for that proactive adjacent to hope.

"Being hopeful" is definitely more passive than "being graceful". Having hope is like a prerequisite for taking the next steps (in grace).

Acting to change your current situation, in my opinion, implies someone has hope—hope that a more favorable circumstance could happen, if they dare to act.

Hope alone is definitely not enough to see it to fruition.

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[deleted] t1_je3fo0n wrote

Hope is a blessing and a curse. It's saved my life, and in the same respect it's kept me alive and therefore suffering.

It's done a ton for humanity, and has also blinded us in times where we probably should have called it quits.

Like during instances of "summit fever," both literally and figuratively, which in the literal sense is where mountain climbers near their goal and begin making more rash and risky choices in the rest of their ascent, and sometimes doing so becomes their demise.

I've cursed hope and hated that I still am hopeful, but mostly I'm in awe of it. Even the tiniest bit is incredibly powerful, at least for one's individual circumstances.

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BernardJOrtcutt t1_je31r0v wrote

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RelativeCheesecake10 t1_je2u1v3 wrote

>>In short, the definition of “scientism” that I would endorse is the following: there are no other ways of knowing apart from those used by the sciences (broadly construed, including history and the humanities). All valid modes of knowing are continuous to each other and rely on pretty much the same methods and modes of inference. If, on the other hand, someone presents us with a method that is completely detached from the ones used in science, like personal intuition or revelation or reading tea leaves, we can be confident that it’s rubbish.

I know I’m a few days late to this post, but I have to take issue here.

First, I think this “broad construal” of science to include history and the humanities makes “science” a meaningless term and is not really defensible. The end of the article names “personal intuition” as a “rubbish” way of knowing that is clearly detached from the methodological continuity of science. But what makes Hegelian dialectical idealism a methodologically continuous part of science that is not present in personal intuition (or, say, astrology)? You could say that it has to do with the lack of comparing notes with others and thinking rigorously, but people talk about and revise their personal intuitions based on empirical information all the time. It’s called gossiping. Is gossiping a science?

Second, I flatly disagree that something like personal intuition is an invalid way of knowing. If I’m a woman on a date and I’m noticing what could be red flags, getting bad vibes, etc, am I to reject that as an invalid type of knowledge, unfit to inform action?

Finally, I think by advocating for or spurring the adoption of this frame, you are legitimating and entrenching colonial epistemological frames. “The humanities” get to count as methodologically continuous with science and therefore valid ways of knowing, but I’ll bet you indigenous traditions don’t. Philosopher Gabriela Veronelli argues that colonialism operates along linguistic lines by separating true, sufficiently sophisticated languages from lower, brutish, pseudo-languages. Colonial subjects are facially excluded from the category of possible interlocutors because their linguistic milieu is thought to be fundamentally unconnected with the type of rationality necessary for “civilized” discourse. This view of what gets to count as a legitimate way of knowing, to me, seems to do much the same: if a person doesn’t have access to traditions that are methodologically continuous with science—or if they find particularly pertinent meaning or knowledge from a tradition that is not methodologically continuous with science—they are told this is an invalid form of knowing and whatever insight should be thrown out on the face of it, without consideration. Meanwhile, ideas emerging from methodological continuity with science like dialectical materialism are worthy of rigorous consideration.

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