I’ve seen something like this argument before and I wonder if you can clarify it for me. In the first premise, what does “could have done otherwise” mean? That if they had decided to do otherwise, they could have?
Surely in a deterministic universe this could still be true, because the deciding to do otherwise would be part of the causal chain leading them to act, so changing that part could change the resulting action.
I don’t really understand the second premise either - surely whether the universe is deterministic or not, once an action has been taken it can’t be changed. Can you clarify how someone could do otherwise than they actually do in any kind of universe?
I think I broadly agree that the article above is arguing from a different conception of free will, in a rather sneaky way.
Atilla_The_Honey t1_j99xtdn wrote
Reply to comment by Ytar0 in Compatibilism is supported by deep intuitions about responsibility and control. It can also feel "obviously" wrong and absurd. Slavoj Žižek's commentary can help us navigate the intuitive standoff. by matthewharlow
I’ve seen something like this argument before and I wonder if you can clarify it for me. In the first premise, what does “could have done otherwise” mean? That if they had decided to do otherwise, they could have?
Surely in a deterministic universe this could still be true, because the deciding to do otherwise would be part of the causal chain leading them to act, so changing that part could change the resulting action.
I don’t really understand the second premise either - surely whether the universe is deterministic or not, once an action has been taken it can’t be changed. Can you clarify how someone could do otherwise than they actually do in any kind of universe?
I think I broadly agree that the article above is arguing from a different conception of free will, in a rather sneaky way.