If you want more, you should check out the Unfinished Tales of Númenor and Middle-earth

>The fact that more women were not mobilized for war work is some¬
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>times taken as one more symptom of the inability of the Nazi regime to
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>demand sacrifices from the German population. In this respect it has
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>often been contrasted to Britain, where an increase in female partici¬
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>pation in the workforce was the key to sustaining the war effort. Such
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>comparisons, however, are completely misleading, since they ignore the
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>fact that the labour market participation of German women in 1939
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>was higher than that reached by Britain and the United States even at
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>the end of the war. In 1939, a third of all married women in Germany
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>were economically active and more than half of all women between the
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>ages of 15 and 60 were in work. As a result, women made up more than
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>a third of the German workforce before the war started, compared to a
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>female share of only a quarter in Britain. A year later, the share of
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>German women in the native workforce stood at 41 per cent, compared
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>to less than 30 per cent in Britain. Not surprisingly, over the following
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>years Britain caught up. But even in 1944 the participation rate for
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>British women between the ages of 15 to 65 was only 41 per cent, as
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>against a minimum of 51 per cent in Germany already in 1939....As we have seen, the burden of maintaining the small peasant farms thatdominated German agriculture fell disproportionately on women'sshoulders. And as farm men were recruited away for the war, this burdengrew ever more arduous. In areas such as Wuerttemberg and Bavaria,with dense populations of peasant farms, female workforce participationrates already exceeded 60 per cent in 1939. It goes without saying thatby sustaining the food supply, Germany's farm women provided anindispensable service to the Nazi war effort.But, even allowing for this difference in economic structure, the German level of mobilization was greater than that in Britain. In Berlin, a major centre of both industrial and service sector employment, with virtually no farm workers, 53 per cent of women were at work in 1939. The same was true of the eastern industrial hub of Saxony. Even in the port towns of Hamburg and Bremen or the heavy industrial centres of the Ruhr, where the occupational structure was particularly unfavourable to female employment, 40 per cent of women of working age had jobs, matching the national average for Britain at the end of the war.

- Wages of Destruction, page 357 and 358
Edit: apologies for formatting

>The German population was not mobilised like the Brits and Russians, for example. Women did not usually go to work in factories

The German population was actually more mobilized than the Brits and Americans in terms of percentage of women working (>50% Germany versus <33% British/American circa 1939). They did not work in the factories as much as the allies because the vast majority of them were working in (relatively inefficient) farms.

Yeah, you are correct to notice those contradictions. The answer is simple: the narrative that "Germany didnt mobilize until it was too late" is arguably largely false. I recommend you read Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze. It gives a good overview of Germany's economy during the war, and it was quite a bombshell when it first came out because he debunks many repeated myths. He basically argues that Germany even at the beginning of the war was pretty close to being "maxed out" - there wasn't much more they could've done.

Its been years since I read the book, but as I recall, during the prewar years, Germany was mobilizing basically as quickly as it reasonably could. Even in these prewar years, Germany was already running into resource and infrastructure limitations - like the trains were getting bogged down and such.

For example, there is the often repeated claim that Germany refused to mobilize its women fully to get them working in factories. Problem: the workforce participation rate of German women is over 50% in 1939, which is higher than the equivalent figure for British and American women at full mobilization in 1945! (well, technically, America never actually mange to reached its full mobilization potential before war ended). I believe the figure for Britain circa 1939 was less than 33%. In terms of women, the Western allies were arguably less mobilized than Germany throughout the entirety of the war. The reason for this is, most of those German women worked in the farms (whereas the allies were able to put their women in factories - so yes, the allies technically had more women in the factories, but that isnt the full picture). Pull those women out of farms to put them into factories, and the British blockade will starve Germany like it did in WW1. Britain got a large chunk of their food overseas and America had the most efficient agriculture sector in the world, so they didnt have this limitation.

As for the oft repeated claim of Speer pulling a miracle, kinda. He did organize things more efficiently, but many of the "miracles" that are commonly credited to him were years in the making. Getting armament production setup and going is a long term process, and it just so happens that that stuff finally came online at around the same time Speer took charge, so it makes his efforts seem more impressive than it already is.

Could German industry have done things better? Yes, with hindsight, there were a ton of things that could've been improved, you could point to this thing or that thing. But you could also say the exact same things about the allies. Tooze basically argues that in the big picture, in the macroeconomic level, and considering that this is the largest industrial war in human history, Germany did their best right from the beginning, and there wasn't a whole of "slack" left that the Germans could've tapped into.