What I mean is that our freedom is the basis of our moral universe. It determines who is part of that universe and its rules. And its binary (or based on a threshold), whether you are subject to moral rules depend on whether you are free. And moral rules must be created based on what free people would agree to.

This is obviously a very controversial topic and I'll be discussing it much more on my substack. If there are any issues that should be addressed, please let me know so I can write about them.

All free humans would be included in the social contract, and would never agree to the slave owners terms, making their laws unjust. The actual social contract would exclude slavery.

Whether animals are included in our moral universe depends on whether they have a conscious (free) experience.

What I mean by objective duties is that there are moral rules that could not be reasonably rejected and would therefore be a part of the social contract (restrictions on murder, slavery, discrimination etc.). This is in some sense metaphysical and some sense dependent on human nature.

The is-ought problem can't be bridged, however the mere pursuit of normativity is enough for reason to bind an agent's freedom and place them under the moral law. And this moral law is objective. Yet this is the whole mission of my substack, so I'll have much more to say about this.

I argue that there are objective duties and beyond that, there is subjective meaning (post coming, and I'd like your thoughts on it). I'll be making one on freedom as well, where I believe that there are two relevant definitions that need some explaining.

I don't mean to glorify freedom, but to find a proper foundation for ethics. Freedom, I argue, happens to fit the bill. (wait till I write my stuff on reason for glorification of concepts, which has the authority to restrict freedom).

I agree that the is-ought divide cannot be bridged, and I'll try to clarify this view further.

Philosophers have been using words like autonomy, agency, etc. However, I think freedom gets the point across better, despite its baggage.

This post deals with meta-ethics, on what grounds morality itself. I don't agree that its obviously utility to the point of tautology. I make that case herein my "utility coach" thought experiment. There I argue that freedom's value exists beyond utility.

I also address the basis for morality here. Happy to hear your thoughts so I can address them in future posts.

There wouldn't be a moral duty to be in top physical health. Nor is there a moral duty to become a doctor to save the man. Nor a moral duty to also become an architect to prevent buildings from being destroyed. And so on. You can create infinite duties from this scenario. And no such duty would be created in the social contract. Therefore, those duties are not moral duties.

I've even questioned the duty to rescue (when rescuing harms others) here. An unlimited duty to rescue wouldn't be accepted in the social contract, since the responsibilities of free parties create acceptable stopping points of duties.

If you have a certain definition of freedom in mind, I'd be happy to hear and use it in future posts.

Step 1) freedom, step 2) reason, step 3) social contract. The article is arguing that freedom, not utility, is step 1.

I'll be discussing that (rights) in future posts, what I mean by liberty is here which is just consciousness/the experience of freedom

if freedom is the basis of morality, then the interactions between the monk and others would be governed by the principles developed in a social contract (this is because the contract is reason-based and is approved by free parties, as discussed here).

Principles against murder would be included, so valuing freedom would forbid killing the monk.

Badly paraphrased Kant*

i'm aware, although many of these definitions can be convoluted. I use Gerald Dworkin's
definition here but what I mean by freedom is only consciousness/the experience of freedom.

Yes people freely move towards utility. This is why I argue freedom grounds the value of utility, since free people would pursue utility. I also wouldn't say people are pursuing freedom. They already have it, and are exercising it when they choose to improve their conditions.

You can think of the question as being "should people be free to increase their utility or should people be forced to increase their utility?" The former grounds ethics on freedom whereas the latter grounds it on welfare.

I will get into rights in a future article, however, so long as someone has freedom, they are a member of the moral universe. Other members cannot deny their freedom.

Reason requires valuing anothers freedom. Since there is no reason from which to deny the monk's freedom, killing him would be morally wrong.

Fair, I address that here. Let me know of any insufficiencies and I will address them in future posts.

I discuss it here, but what I mean by freedom is only the subjective experience of freedom. Someone can kill to maximize utility, which according to utilitarians is good. But we know its morally wrong.

Someone can kill in the name of freedom, yet except in very narrow cases (self-defense, defense of others), that person would be wrong according to my view since they are failing to respect another's freedom.

I talk about that here. When I say freedom, I mean only the experience of freedom.

I should have linked this article in the post, but I address it here.

Basically, since freedom is the foundation of morality, and others have freedom, the only way to create a moral system is through a social contract. The contract respects the freedom of others as it would include principles that cannot be reasonably rejected by free people.

So one's freedom to kill isn't moral, not because of the utility consequences, but because it doesn't respect another freedom by failing to abide by the social contract.

Yes, for example, utopians and fundamentalists have justified their brutal actions for the sake of the future well-being they were seeking to create. What're a few murders compared to the ideal communist state or an eternity in heaven?

Summary: Is freedom valuable because it lets us pursue utility, or is utility good because free people would pursue it? I argue the latter, grounding morality in freedom rather than utility.

First, valuing utility above all else can lead to morally perverse outcomes, as many hypotheticals have shown. These thought experiments can be satisfactorily resolved by valuing freedom instead. Second, utility arises as part of an amoral biological process of evolutionary adaptation. Something amoral cannot create something moral. Third, since utility is subjective, its utility is shaped by our freedom. How we choose to experience something determines its value to us. Freedom therefore grounds utility.

Making the case for these universal principles is the purpose of my newsletter. I've made a previous argument recognizing the foundational principles of all just societies in the link below. If you have any criticisms, I'd love to hear them so I can address them in future posts.

https://garik.substack.com/p/foundation-principles-and-formal

Part of what makes laws reasonable is that they reflect universal principles that free people would accept, which require certain procedural mechanisms and don't presume any substantive conceptions of justice.

It's like saying a fair contract is one where the process is fair, and the outcome isn't substantially unjust. If those conditions are met, the contract is upheld; if not it becomes voidable/void. This is still a weak requirement and reasonable law regimes would encompass every liberal democracy.

What reasonable people could agree to. Although this is more procedural fairness than substantive.

So long as rights are generally protected, the rule of law is respected, a functioning democratic process is in place, and the outcome isn't blantanly unjust, laws are reasonable (although not necessarily ideal).

Summary: There are three types of legal regimes. Reasonable law regimes are democratic institutions that respect the rule of law. As a result, citizens are morally obligated to obey the law when pursuing reform. Unreasonable law regimes are authoritarian, yet the government still has ideals of legitimacy that they seek to live up to. Under these regimes, civil disobedience is morally justified to force governments to live up to these ideals. And under non-law regimes, there is no legitimate relationship between the government and the people. Necessity is a justification for even violent acts under these regimes.