Yep, that’s the next step. Once the value of people’s freedom is recognized, they’ll act according to that value by obeying the term of the social contract, the expression of individuals’ freedom.

Well your neighbor in that case already has freedom. Now it’s just about recognition and valuing of freedom. But I wouldn’t argue that people would necessarily want others to have freedom (say non-conscious animals). All I argue is that freedom is equal in one dimension and because it’s not agent relative, must have a universal value in itself.

Then I still wouldn’t say there is a justification for valuing’s someone freedom at 0, given the status of freedom as an agency creating asset, rather than dependent on personal agency. So any claim that “X is valuable because it’s mine” isn’t justifiable since X’s value doesn’t rely on that persons personal agency.

Not valuing the same, but valuing at all. Only in the former question can you can get into issues of degrees. But the latter is binary.

If we both have possession X, and I value my X for itself, then I can’t say that your exact possession X isn’t valuable because I am me. It’s not a reason that can’t be reasonably rejected.

Children meanwhile are valued through an agent-relative relationship, unique between child and parent. But agency isn’t agent-relative but it’s agency itself. It’s a possession which everyone has in equal capacity and no justifiable difference exists (you can’t say that one is more free than others).

What’s being valued isn’t living status or welfare but the power of agency. Agency isn’t agent-relative but it’s agency itself. It’s a possession which everyone has in equal capacity and no justifiable difference exists (you can’t say that one is more free than others).

But it’s because the skeptic values reason as well, that they would have to have a justification to value their own freedom. They would have to have a non-arbitrary difference between their freedom and others’ freedom for them to justify valuing only their own. And because freedom is equal, in that a difference is not possible, then the skeptic would have to value freedom generally.

This is intuitive as well. We understand that free beings have value compared to non-free beings (inanimate objects). We wouldn’t have a reasonable justification to prioritize only our own freedom is freedom is equal.

What the painting has is sentimental value, so if the person said that they valued sentimental value, they would have to value the sentimental value of the painting.

Although no one would normally say that they valued sentimental value itself since its agent-relative. Yet freedom, on the other hand, is agency itself. It can be thought of instead as a possession. It doesn't depend on an agent's perspective because that's what freedom is, an agent's perspective. Our freedom is identical to one another as an asset. There is no basis on which it can be differentiated like utility can be (since its also agent-relative).

Thanks for the engagement, let me know if this addresses your concern.

If it can be reasonably rejected, then its not a good reason. No one would want to bind their freedom to that specific reason.

No people are not identical, but they possess identical freedom. There's no basis for differentiating one's own freedom from another. In the same way that you cannot say you are more "alive" than another living being (except metaphorically) being "more free" makes about as much sense. If you value reason, then you can't deny that people's freedom are equal, since there is no basis for stating otherwise.

If morality is just rational interest, subject to game theoretic stability, then its not morality, just rationality. Why not be a free rider if there are no consequences to being so? Thats what I mean by morality.

Reasons is a public justification in favor of something. And if you want to constrain someone's freedom, it must be on the basis of some justifiable reason that couldn't be reasonably rejected.

Since freedom is a property of the skeptic, and the skeptic has no reasonable basis from differentiating this property from the equal properties of others, the skeptic would have to recognize and value the freedom of others. There is no reason to prioritize his freedom-asset over that of others which can be publicly justified.

I take the values of reason and freedom as a given. I don't question those values, only recognize that they are implied in the skeptic's question. Morality derives as a consequence of those values. So if someone said they valued reason and X, then they must value X generally. Otherwise they'd run afoul of valuing reason.

What value we choose to impose on something is always subjective, it comes internally. There is no "value" within the material of a thing. There's only our imposition of value.

If someone were to say that a valued sentimental value, they wouldn’t be acting according to that value if they ripped up that painting. The painting has sentimental value, regardless of who imposes that value onto it.

Some things I have have sentimental value. They have property X. Things you have also have sentimental value, the same property X. I can say that I don’t value your painting as much as you do. But I cannot say that the painting lacks sentimental value (clearly it does to you).

Summary: freedom + reason = morality. The basis of normativity is inherently free individuals discovering reasonable justifications for restrictions on freedom. Asking "why should I be moral?” already presupposes (in the question itself) the values of freedom and reason, as well as reason’s priority over freedom.

Since the questioner values freedom, but recognized reason as an authority over freedom, the questioner must recognize and value the freedom of others, having no justification to do otherwise. The questioner has no reasonable basis to value only his own freedom, given that he possesses the same freedom as others. Any differentiation would therefore be arbitrary and would violate his own valuing of reason.

Nice piece! I discuss these theories and my own theory that incorporates them here

>the experience of free will (what we mean by free will)

This is controversial to some. Yet what I argue what we mean when we say free will is our phenomenological experience of free will, rather than an objective free will. This is why I separate the two.

And whether a being is free determines whether they are a member of a moral community, bound to moral law. I discuss it here. This is what I mean by freedom setting the boundaries.

Morals don’t differ, although formal legal rules can. All just laws must rely on the same foundational moral principles. My substack is focused on addressing just this issue and will be happy to address critiques in future posts.

Positive and negative freedom describe relationships with others. These concepts are internal.

Our actually free selves wouldn't create our moral rules, its only a descriptive fact that we experience free will (and this is what we mean when we talk about free will) and its this experience that gives us moral responsibility. It's freedom in the broad sense.

Our consciously free selves is the self that acts in accordance with its higher order principles by reflecting on itself and its actions (or philosophical autonomy). And its this free self that creates our moral rules.

So actual freedom is just possessing free will and conscious freedom is acting in accordance with principles and consequently, the ability to create moral laws.

I'll be discussing these ideas more in future posts if you are interested, but let me know if you'd like me to clarify anything or if there's something I should talk about going forward.

Actual freedom is a descriptive fact. It's only the experience of free will (what we mean by free will), or our actual selves. While actual freedom sets the boundaries of our moral community (members must be free and moral rules are limited to those we can freely obey) our actual free selves aren't parties to the social contract.

Conscious freedom (or as philosophers may call it, autonomy) is acting in accordance with our higher order principles. For social contract purposes, this means that our conscious selves would create universal moral rules based on the principles of freedom and reason. Our consciously free selves create and consent to the social contract.

That means a lot!! However I’ll be cautious in future posts to not rush through ideas and keep the reader in mind. Your feedback is hugely appreciated and I hope you’ll continue slogging through while I make the case for contractualism.

Actual freedom: the sensation/experience of freedom. Its what we mean when we say free will

Conscious freedom: acting so as to live up to our higher-order principles. We are free from the constraints that prevent us from acting according to our ideals. This is obeying the law that we ourselves would legislate (a Kantian idea of freedom).

These definitions are internal, rather than external, like liberty.

These definitions are useful since I've read the term "freedom" being used in both meanings, which is confusing.

However, let me know if you have any criticisms. I'd be happy to respond.

I discuss my views on free will here. Free will exists as a phenological experience and it shapes the boundaries of our moral universe. If free will is an illusion, then everything must be an illusion. So long as we can say our perceptions of the world exist, free will exists.

If you have any criticisms, I'd be happy to hear them and address them in future posts.

Thank you, I’ll keep that in mind! I should have taken more time to explain this example, but instead I summarized my views on free will too quickly. Much appreciated!!