"a system of philosophy or political philosophy that assumes its own incorrectness"

I don't know if anything like that does or could exist, but public choice theory comes to mind as a system of reasoning about politics (which is not the same as a political philosophy!) that assumes that political actors are self-interested.

Regarding your iterative democracy

It is an interesting idea, but think about the things it has in common with contemporary representative democracy, and how poorly some of that stuff tends to work out in practice. Most laws and regulations are subject to notice and comment periods and subject to progressive amendment prior to becoming law. The idea being that interested parties can submit analyses and proposed revisions so that the law ends up better than it otherwise would. But what happens in practice is the "logic of collective action" comes into play: concentrate benefits, diffuse costs. This is how you end up with these laws that start as "No factory may emit xyz noxious chemicals into the water supply" and end up as "No factory may emit xyz noxious chemicals into the water supply unless it is a factory that processes potatoes": Frito-Lay (or whoever) has a big incentive to spend resources proposing and pushing for that amendment, and when it comes time for that politician to be accountable to voters they can point out that "I fought for environmental regulations that protect America's farmers!". The people who bear the cost of that amendment do so incrementally, almost invisibly on the individual voter basis. So they don't have a strong enough incentive to put together an interest group that counters Frito-Lay in this made up example.

Now I know that is not quite what you are proposing, but to me the most critical part of "assuming its own incorrectness" is for your proposal to take into account the fact that people are not going to behave like Plato's philosopher kings in practice. So how do you account for interest groups, collective action problems, self-interested political actors, etc.?

I find this interesting but hard to really evaluate. Pretty much any time I see a philosophical thesis that is chalk full of words/phrases like "capitalism", "modernity", "praxis", I think it is helpful to try to rewrite your thesis in as simple and straightforward language as possible and see if a) it still makes sense, and b) it isn't a trivial truth.

You'll see this issue even with famous philosophers (usually French philosophers that aren't read much in philosophy departments but worshipped in some other humanities). They'll say something like "Under late capitalism, the wisdom of modernity falls into the crux of folly, for only if we deconstruct capitalist production itself can existence be retained in the post-structural sense" and it's like oooh it sounds so deep but when forced to state the point simply it's just an obvious simple thing like "some forms of industry are bad for the environment".

Martha Nussbaum, a leading contemporary philosopher and legal scholar, has some great stuff on the philosophy of disgust and the law. It isn't strictly or exclusively about scent, but I think her general discussion of disgust might be useful. She is also definitely sensitive to how this all can be particularly impactful towards women.

The book is "Hiding from Humanity", and you can probably find some talks and readings online as well searching for "Martha Nussbaum on Disgust"

Nobody has solved it.

The most important thing to have when approaching this debate (or any other major philosophical debate) is epistemic humility. If you think that moral truths are obviously objective, or obviously subjective, consider the possibility that you're missing some of the complexity of the arguments on the other side.

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One thing worth doing here is laying out out the universe of major debates in meta-ethics, because a lot of times "subjectivism" gets conflated with a lot of different views.

Moral Realism is the view that there are some true moral facts. Say, murder is wrong.

Moral Anti-Realism is not just "subjectivism" but could be divided into some different views:

1. Non-cognitivists believe that moral statements are not the sorts of things that can be true or false. They may just be expressions of approval or emotion. So "murder is wrong", according to a non-cognitivist, might just mean something like "boo murder!". They key here is that moral statements are not beliefs. "murder is wrong" is neither true nor false on this view.

2. Error theorists believe that moral statements ARE beliefs that could be true or false, but that they are never true. So "murder is wrong", according to an error theorist, is false. It is false not because murder is good, but because the property "wrongness" doesn't exist in the world.

Subjectivism is technically a moral realist position by my definition. But Traditional moral realists are objectivists, believing that the truth or falsity of moral statements are mind-independent. So "murder is wrong" is either true or false no matter what I happen to think about murder. Non-objectivists believe moral truths are somehow mind-dependent. Subjectivism would say "murder is wrong" means something like "I disapprove of murder". But there are other non-objectivist positions. Cultural relativism, for example, would say "murder is wrong" means something like "my culture disapproves of murder".

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I'm not taking a view on any of these questions, I just wanted to lay out the landscape for you for further reading or maybe help you pinpoint your own views. Very important to remember that anybody who is giving glibly confident answers to these questions probably doesn't understand all the nuance because this stuff is not easy.