Cecilia, you’re breaking my heart

I don’t think you should be so quick to reject the possibility that value could be objective. But if you want to go with the assumption that value is subjective, you might want to look at how subjectivists about value have tried to incorporate values into their moral theories.

Some of the disagreement between relativists and non-relativists might be due to a failure to adequately distinguish morals from mores; that is, genuine moral principles from social custom and expectation.

I think it would be helpful if you clarified what falls within the moral sphere and what doesn’t. I worry that you’re position excludes things that should be part of morality, but it’s hard to say for sure at this point.

As I said regarding one of your previous pieces, I am very sympathetic to the idea that morality is closely connected with what we could all reasonably agree to in principle. But, I have some issues with what you say here.

You say that morality only concerns issues of right and wrong, and does not concern good and bad, or value. You also say that good/bad/value is subjective. I think there is a substantive debate as to whether good/bad/value is subjective or objective. Maybe more importantly, it seems like good, bad, and value are a part of morality, just as much as right and wrong.

I see that you want to use the distinction between right and wrong, on the one hand, and good and bad on the other, to try to show that relativists and non-relativists are talking past one another. To the extent that they are, I think there’s probably a better way of capturing this than removing good and bad from the sphere of moral consideration.

I also worry about how limited the moral sphere seems to be on your view. It seems like if there’s any sort or controversy about an issue, it turns out to be a personal issue and not a moral one. But, surely part of the point of moral philosophy is to try to find answers where there is controversy. A moral theory that only applies in cases of universal agreement is impotent.

I think you can skip over a lot of the introductory stuff and get to the point. It covers a lot of territory, but none of it in enough depth to be useful.

As to the main proposal, I am attracted to the idea that morality is importantly related to what we can rationally agree to, so I’m kind of an audience for this kind of proposal. When your first offer your account of morality, I thought you were underestimating the amount of moral disagreement there is, and that demanding actual agreement about moral principles is not a viable standard. But, later it seemed like you thought morality only concerns what there is consensus about, which is why you say the trolley problem is not a moral dilemma at all — there’s no agreement here, and morality is based on rational agreement. I think this just puts too much outside the scope of morality which we would intuitively include within it.

Anyways, at one point you seem to say morality is based on hypothetical imperatives. You might. E interested in this paper by Philippa Foot.

There are those who think that life has nothing left to chance…

Perhaps, but what does that have to do with the post?

How so?

I admit I haven’t read this part of the Nicomachean Ethics recently, but it at least fits with my recollection, and how Aristotle approaches ethical issues elsewhere in the work.

I would like if you would clarify and expand upon the relation between Aristotle’s thought and our current economic situation. Our economic system is in important respects very different from that of Aristotle’s time and place. Do Aristotle’s comment still apply? Do they need to be altered? In what ways? What would Aristotle say about modern developments in economic thought? There are many avenues you could take here.

“Follows from” indicates either a justificatory or causal relationship. It’s not clear that either requires determinism.

I think this misses the main issue.

Whether and to what extent the decision of the average couple to have children makes the climate problem worse, depends on large-scale issues of policy and technology.

If we make the large-scale shift to solar, wind, and so on that we need, probably investments in carbon capture technology as well, it will be fine for people to continue having kids. If we don’t make those changes, well, whether you’re 1 meter under water or 50, you’re still drowning.

This is a problem that demands a large-scale, systematic solution. Talking about whether Joe and Jane should or shouldn’t have kids is a distraction.

I don’t see how utilitarianism necessarily follows from that.

What do you mean by consciousness being valenced, and what do you mean by closed individualism?

Try here

The deductive argument seeks to show that God cannot exist given the existence of evil. The inductive argument seeks to show that it is very improbable that God exists given the sheer amount of evil in the world.

Most philosophers agree that the deductive problem fails; it’s the inductive version that you should think about.

Okay, the key claim is that God’s omnipotence does not mean the ability to violate genuine principles of logic, so God is in some sense limited. Thus, any evil must be necessary. Here’s the key quote:

“With the above, the classical problem of evil has been decimated. Evil is somehow necessary. God had to do it in order to make us. Why would an all-loving, all-powerful God put us in such an evil world and cause or allow such evil things to occur? The only answer is that he must cause or allow such things to occur. No, this does not diminish his omnipotence even slightly. He could have not created us. He could have created some other foreign existence. However, for this world of differentiation to exist, in which I am me and you are you and you are not me and I am not you, this world of evil is somehow a necessity.”

The problem with this is the one raised by Hume in his Dialogues. If we are assured there is an all good, all knowing, and all powerful God, then we may reasonably conclude that the evil we witness is somehow justified. But (many think) we do not have such an assurance. We approach the issue of God’s existence as a possibility, not a certainty, and the evil we witness counts against it.

I don’t claim this challenge is final, by any means, but I don’t think the author of this piece has really engaged with this aspect of the problem.

Utilitarianism is not the only option though.

Feel free to message me.

What is a freelance philosopher, and where does one apply!

(Asking for a friend)